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In this paper, we consider how the retirement age as well as a tax financed pension system 
ought to respond to a change in the standard deviation of the length of life. In a first best 
framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals’ 
labor supply and retirement-decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard 
deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age and vice versa, if the 
preferences for “the number of years spent in retirement” are characterized by constant or 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. A similar result follows in a second best setting, where the 
government raises revenue via a proportional tax (or pension fee) to finance a lump-sum 
benefit per year spent in retirement. We consider two versions of this model, one with a 
mandatory retirement age decided upon by the government and the other where the retirement 
age is a private decision-variable. 
JEL-Code: D61, D80, H21, H55. 
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In 1913, the Swedish parliament decided upon a general public pension. The retirement age 
was set to 67. At that time, the expected life-length was 55 years, implying that the expected 
length of life fell short of the retirement age by 12 years. According to these rules, and the 
average length of life at the time, most people would never benefit from the public pension 
system. Since then, the expected length of life has increased considerably and was 81 years in 
2008 for Sweden. Similar increases in the expected life-length have taken place in most other 
countries. There is a large literature dealing with the ageing of the population and the 
consequences this ought to have for the design of pension schemes.
1 
 
It is well known that the average length of life has increased considerably in the western 
world during the last 150 years and more recently also in the less developed countries. 
However, another important change in the mortality process is that the standard deviation of 
the length of life has decreased. Sweden has unusually good historical demographic statistics, 
so it is possible to follow this development over time. As the mortality among infants has a 
large influence both on the expected length of life and on the standard deviation, it is 
customary to calculate the standard deviation (or variance) in the length of life for those who 
have survived until at least age 10. This measure is usually denoted  10 s . For Sweden,  10 s  was 
21 around 1750 and had decreased to around 12.5 in year 2000.
2  There is also a large cross-
country variation in the standard deviation of life-length. This is particularly so if one 
compares developed and less developed countries, although there is variation also between 
developed countries. For instance, while Sweden has the most equal distribution of life-length 
with  10 s  being around 12.5 years, the U.S. has one of the most unequal distributions among 
developed countries with a standard deviation,  10 s , of 15 years.
3 
 
How would the optimal retirement age as well as the individual contribution to and benefit 
from the pension system respond to changes in the standard deviation of the length of life? 
                                                 
1 This literature focuses on a variety of issues such as how the pension system affects retirement incentives at the 
individual level and labor supply behavior among the elderly (e.g., Gruber and Wise, 1999; Coile and Gruber, 
2007), the optimal legal retirement age (Lacomba and Lagos, 2006) as well as the direction of reforms of social 
security (Diamond, 2005; Diamond and Orszag, 2005). 
2 See Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005,  p. 654).  
3 See Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005, p. 653).   3
This, of course, depends on what we see as the reason for having a public pension scheme. 
Many alternative motives for public pension schemes have been discussed over time. One is 
that the market for annuities is not well functioning. It is, therefore, difficult for individuals to 
handle the uncertainty of the length of life. How much should be saved for the old age? How 
should individuals plan their consumption path in the old age? One role for a public pension 
scheme is to mitigate the problems associated with an uncertain length of life. It is this 
property that we focus on in the present paper.  Our analysis shows that the standard deviation 
of the length of life has important implications for the optimal retirement age. The nature of 
this influence is, in turn, quite complex and depends crucially on individuals’ risk aversion 
with respect to the number of years they plan to spend in retirement. An interesting policy 
implication of our analysis is that Sweden and the US should have different retirement ages 
due to differences in the standard deviation of life-length, even if we were to disregard all 
other differences between the two countries. As far as we know, the connection between the 




To obtain a tractable model, we make several simplifying assumptions, the details of which 
will be laid out in section 2 below. One such simplification is that the individuals have no 
better knowledge about their own mortality than the policy maker (i.e. we abstract from 
asymmetric information); another is that the individuals’ life-time utility functions exhibit 
temporal risk neutrality.
5 In our model, the objective of the policy maker is to design the 
pension scheme in such a way that the expected lifetime utility faced by the representative 
consumer is maximized. Part of the solution to this problem is obtained by providing a certain 
consumption stream during the old age independently of how old an individual becomes. We 
shall both consider a first best framework where the government exercises full control over 
the resource allocation by deciding upon individual consumption, labor supply and retirement 
ages, as well as two different second best models where the government raises revenue by 
using a tax (or pension fee) proportional to labor income to finance a pension-benefit per year 
spent in retirement. One of the second best models contains a mandatory retirement age 
                                                 
4 There are studies focusing on other aspects of the variation in the length of life between individuals. For 
example, Bommier et al. (2007) consider redistribution between individuals with different life-lengths. A crucial 
assumption in their work is that the individual life-time utilities exhibit temporal risk aversion. 
5 We also abstract from other sources of asymmetric information, such as unobserved differences in the ability to 
work during old age. Cremer et al. (2004) consider a model where the productivity and health status are private 
information and vary between consumers. They show that the second best optimal policy may imply a distortion 
of the retirement behavior.     4
decided upon by the government, while the retirement age is a private decision-variable in the 
other. Real world pension systems often contain elements of both mandatory retirement 
(typically in the form of a lowest age when pension benefits become available) and individual 
retirement choices. To simplify the analysis, and capture how uncertainty with respect to the 
length of life affects the retirement age, we consider mandatory retirement and private 
retirement choices as two separate regimes. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model of individual 
behavior. Section 3 deals with the first best decision-problem and solution; in particular, we 
examine how the resource allocation responds to a change in the standard deviation of the 
length of life (as well as a change in the average length of life). In Sections 4 and 5, we 
consider a simple pension scheme in combination with a choice of retirement age, which is 
either made by the government (Section 4) or the individual consumer (Section 5). The 
pension system is such that the individual pays a tax (or pension fee) proportional to the labor 
income when young and receives a pension benefit when old. We use both versions of the 
model to analyze how the optimal pension fee, old-age benefit and retirement age depend on 
the standard deviation of the length of life. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider a representative individual with preferences over the life-time consumption, the 
number of years spent in retirement, and the time spent on leisure while being part of the 
labor force, respectively. The assumption that the individual derives utility from the number 
of years spent in retirement is justified by the observation that the step from being a worker to 
being retired opens up a whole new spectrum of opportunities regarding time-use (e.g., 
developing new, and time-consuming, hobbies) as well as implies fewer restrictions on the 
residential choice. As a consequence, the utility associated with retirement may differ in a 
fundamental way from the utility of leisure during the working-life, which motivates that 
these two aspects of “non-working time” are treated separately. We assume that the utility 







CP TR U H h

    ,                      (1) 
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where C is annual consumption, T the length of life, R the retirement age and h the annual 
hours of work. The term H is interpretable as a fixed time endowment per period. The 
function   t UH h   shows the utility of leisure in period t. The number of years spent in 
retirement is given by TR   and the utility derived from the number of years spent in 
retirement is represented by the function  () PT R  . We assume that the functions  () P   and 
() U   are increasing and strictly concave in their respective argument. The properties of the 
function   P   drive many of our results; in particular, the sign of the third derivative will 
determine the sign of important comparative statics. We assume here that the length of life is 
a random variable in the sense that TT   , where T  is the expected life-length,   a 
random variable with mean zero and unit variance, and  0    a parameter. This means that   
is interpretable as the standard deviation of the length of life. 
 
In the absence of any pension system, the life-time budget constraint facing the individual can 










                         (2) 
 
where w is the hourly gross wage rate. In the next three sections, we use this basic model to 
analyze relationships between, on the one hand, the optimal retirement age and pension design 
and, on the other, the standard deviation of the length of life. 
 
3. A First Best Approach 
 
We start by considering a first best decision-problem, where the policy maker decides upon 
the consumption, hours of work and retirement age for a large number of identical 
individuals. To simplify the analysis, and be able to focus on the relationship between the 
retirement age and standard deviation of life-length, we assume that the consumption is equal 
during all years, and that the hours of work are constant during the years spent working. 
 
Since the age of death is a stochastic variable, the budget constraint facing an individual will 
be stochastic as well. However, we assume that the number of individuals in the economy as a 
whole is large enough to imply that the resource constraint at the aggregate level can be   6
treated as deterministic. The resource constraint for the policy maker can, therefore, be 
written as 
 
0 TC Rwh  .                        (3) 
 
The objective of the policy maker is to maximize the expected utility of a typical individual, 
i.e. 
 
[ ()() ] [ () ]() ET C PT R R V H h T C EPT R R U H h                           (4) 
 
where  E denotes the expectations operator. Using TT   , where  ( ) 0 E    and 
() 1 Var   , and then substituting equation (3) into equation (4), we can write the optimization 




Rh Max Rwh E P T R RU H h   . 
 
The first order conditions for R and h become 
 
    '( ) ( ) 0 wh E P T R U H h                         (5a) 
 '( ) 0 wUH h   .                      (5b) 
 
We can then derive the following functions for the optimal retirement age and hours of work; 
 
  (, ,) RR w T 
 
                         (6) 
 () hh w

                           (7) 
 
in which the sign of the comparative statics derivative (when the sign is unambiguous) is 
given above each argument. The comparative statics derivatives are presented in the 
Appendix. Equations (6) and (7) show that an increase in the wage rate leads to an increase in 
the retirement age and an increase in the hours of work per period when participating in the 
labor market: in other words, both labor supply dimensions are modified in response to a   7
change in the wage rate. A change in average length of life, on the other hand, only leads to 
an increase in the retirement age, while the hours of work per period remain unaffected. This 
is a consequence of quasi-linearity, which means that a higher T  does not affect the tradeoff 
between consumption and leisure within a given period. In fact, as we show in the Appendix, 
our model implies  /1 RT   , so an increase in the life expectancy by one year means that 
the retirement is postponed by one year as well. The reason as to why   does not affect the 
hours of work is analogous; it does not affect the tradeoff between consumption and leisure. 
 
The qualitative effect on the retirement age of an increase in the standard deviation of life-
length,   , is ambiguous in general. One can show that  / cov( , '') sign R sign P      . If 
cov( , '') 0 P    ( 0  ), then  / 0 R     ( 0  ). A sufficient condition for cov( , '') P   to be 
positive is that the sub-utility function capturing the preferences for the number of years spent 





''( ) ''( )
'( ) '( )
PA PA
PA PA
  for  21 AA  . 
With increasing absolute risk aversion, cov( , '') P   can be either positive or negative. 
 
In summary, we have derived the following results; 
 
Proposition 1. In the first best, an increase (decrease) in the life-expectancy, T , leads to an 
increase (decrease) in the optimal retirement age. If the preferences for the number of years 
spent in retirement are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an 
increase (decrease) in the standard deviation of the length of life,  , leads to a decrease 
(increase) in the optimal retirement age, i.e.  /0 R   . 
 
The intuition behind the effect of a change in   is as follows: if the preferences for the 
number of years spent in retirement are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, there is no precautionary motive to delay the retirement age in response to increased 
uncertainty about the length of life. Instead, the optimal response will be to decrease the 
retirement age, which increases the likelihood that any consumer will be able to enjoy a 
period of retirement. Conversely, reduced uncertainty about the length of life, i.e. a decrease   8
in   , gives an incentive to postpone retirement, because the future benefits associated with 
retirement are less uncertain than before. With increasing absolute risk aversion, on the other 
hand, there is a precautionary motive for labor market participation (i.e. to earn more income) 
in response to increased uncertainty, which has a counteracting influence and renders the total 
effect ambiguous. 
 
4. A Second Best Model with Mandatory Retirement 
 
We begin this section by characterizing and solving the decision-problem faced by the 
individual, which is here limited to a choice of consumption and work hours (for a given 
retirement age). The final part concerns the policy-problem facing the government and its 
solution; in particular, how the (mandatory) retirement age, pension fee and old-age benefit 




In reality, the consumption path of an individual may vary over the life-cycle; for instance, the 
planned consumption might be smaller for years where the probability of living is low than 
for years where the probability of living is high. Likewise the hours of work might vary 
between periods of the working life. To be able to focus attention on retirement behavior and 
pension-policy within a simple model, we abstract from these aspects by assuming (as we did 
in sections 2 and 3 above) that the consumption remains constant over the life-cycle, and that 
the hours of work per period are constant when the consumer participates in the labor market. 
 
To be more specific, suppose that the individual lives for at most 
max T  years, and that the sub-


















  . 
 
This formulation will imply that the consumption is equalized over the life-cycle, and that the 
hours of work are constant over all years of work (as in the previous section). As a   9
consequence, we eliminate the time-index, t, below. As before, the individual also receives 
utility from the number of years spent in retirement,  ( )
ii PT R  .   
 
The individual plans for the eventuality of living until the age of 
max T  years, although the 
probability of this event might be quite small.
6 Therefore, the budget constraint takes the form 
 
max max (1 ) ( ) 0
ii i i Rw h T R B T C     .                    (8) 
 
In equation (8),   is the contribution rate to the pension system, which is proportional to the 
labor income and paid during the time-period spent in the labor force, and B a lump-sum 
pension per year spent in retirement. In this section, we consider a mandatory retirement age 
decided upon by the government, which is treated as exogenous by the individual. Therefore, 
the individual chooses consumption and work hours to maximize the expected utility subject 
to the budget constraint, i.e. 
 
[( ) ] ( )
,
ii i i i i
ii
Max E T C P T R R U H h
Ch
  
                    (9) 
 
subject to equation (8). Since 
i T  is stochastic, in all events except when 
max i TT   the 
individual will leave a “bequest”. We assume this bequest gives no utility to the individual. It 
is a consequence of the uncertain life-time and the absence of a market for annuities. As 
before, we have 
ii TT   , where  ( ) 0
i E    and  ( ) 1
i Var   . By substituting the budget 





max (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
ii i i i i i
h
T
Max R wh T R B E P T R R U H h
T
             . 
 
The first order condition for 
i h  becomes 
 
                                                 
6 This assumption is, of course, arbitrary. Our argument is that, if the individual does not consider the possibility 
that he/she may live to the age of 
max T ,  he/she may end up with too little resources during old age. As long as 
the individual plans for the possibility that his/her life may be longer than the average life-length, the final year 
assumed in the budget is not important.   10




    .                    (10) 
 
As the individuals are identical ex-ante, they will choose the same number of work hours. 
Equation (10) is a slight modification of the standard labor supply condition saying that the 
marginal utility of consumption times the marginal wage rate per period spent working must 
be equal to the marginal utility of leisure. The weight 
max / TT  attached to the marginal wage 
rate appears as a consequence of expected utility maximization in combination with the 
assumption that the consumer recognizes that he/she may reach the age 
max T . We can use 
equation (10) to derive the labor supplied when participating in the labor market as function 
of   and T  (suppressing the before-tax wage rate) 
 
  (, )
i hh hT 
 
                       (11) 
 
in which we have indicated the sign of each comparative static derivative above the 
corresponding argument. The intuition is straight forward: an increase in the contribution rate 
to the pension system reduces the marginal wage rate and, therefore, hours of work, while an 
increase in the life-expectancy provides an incentive to accumulate more income when 




The government maximizes the expected utility for a typical cohort with ex-ante identical 
individuals by choosing the retirement age, R , contribution rate to the pension system,  , 
and pension benefit per year spent in retirement, B . We can write the objective function of 




max (, , , ,) { (, ) ( 1 ) ( )} [ ( ) ]
(( , ) )
T
VB R T R w h T T R BE P T R
T
RU H h T
  

    


.            (12) 
 
The government’s budget constraint is written as 
   11
  (, ) [ ] 0 Rwh T T R B    .                      (13) 
 
The budget constraint (13) builds on the assumption that all (unintended) bequests are 
returned lump-sum to the government. 
 
By solving equation (13) for B  and substituting into equation (12), we can write the decision-




max , (1 ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )
R
TR w h
Max Rwh T R E P T R RU H h
TT R 





where TT , while the dependence of h on   and T  has been suppressed for notational 
convenience. The first order conditions can then be written as 
 








       
                  (14a) 
  R : 
max max
max 2 (1 ) [ '( )] ( ) 0
()
TT T T R
wh Rwh wh E P T R U H h
TT R T R
 
 




Equations (14a) and (14b) implicitly define the optimal contribution rate and retirement age, 
respectively. Therefore, by solving for the optimal contribution rate and retirement age, and 
then substituting into the public budget constraint in equation (13), we can derive the optimal 
pension benefit per year spent in retirement. 
  
Our main concern here is how a change in the standard deviation of life-length affects the 
optimal retirement age, pension fee and old age benefit, respectively. With equations (13) and 
(14) at our disposal, we have derived the following result; 
 
Proposition 2.  If the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement are 
characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase (decrease), in the 
standard deviation of life-length leads to (i) a decrease (increase) in the retirement age, (ii) a 
decrease (increase) in the contribution rate to the pension system and (iii) a decrease   12
(increase) in the pension benefit per year spent in retirement, i.e.  /0 R   ,  /0      and 
/0 B     at the second best optimum. 
 
The calculations behind Proposition 2 are presented in the Appendix. The intuition is straight 
forward: with constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, increased uncertainty about the 
length of life provides an incentive for the government to decrease the retirement age which, 
in turn, increases the likelihood that the consumer will be able to enjoy the benefits associated 
with retirement. Equivalently, reduced uncertainty about the length of life gives an incentive 
to postpone retirement. This is analogous to the corresponding result derived in a first best 
framework in Section 3. 
 
Turning to the responses in the pension variables, note that a decrease in the retirement age 
(following an increase in the standard deviation of life-length) leads to a decrease in the 
planned consumption over the whole life-cycle, ceteris paribus, at the second best optimum 
with the contribution rate held constant. This can be seen by substituting  /( ) B Rwh T R    
from the public budget constraint into equation (8) and then differentiating with respect to R , 
in which case we obtain 
 
max max [( ){( )/( )}]
(1 ) 0






    

. 
A decrease in the contribution rate to the pension system counteracts this effect, as it leads to 








   

 
in which we have used that equations (14) are fulfilled at the second best optimum. As a 
consequence, there is an incentive for the policy maker to offset the lost consumption 
associated with early retirement by reducing the contribution rate or vice versa. This explains 
why the optimal retirement age and contribution rate to the pension system move in the same 
direction in response to increased or decreased uncertainty with respect to the length of life. 
Then, by using the public budget constraint, it follows that the pension benefit per year spent 
in retirement must move in the same direction as well. 
 
Given the assumptions on which Proposition 2 is based, an interesting implication is that a 
country with a relatively low standard deviation of the length of life can be expected to have a   13
higher retirement age and a more generous pension system (in terms of the levels of 
contribution rates and pension benefits) than a country with a relatively high standard 
deviation of the length of life, everything else held constant. For instance, our model predicts 
that Sweden ought to have a higher retirement age, higher contribution rates to the pension 
system and higher pension benefits per year spent in retirement than the U.S., because the 
standard deviation of life-length is higher in the U.S. than in Sweden. 
 
Note also that if the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement are characterized 
by increasing absolute risk aversion (instead of constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion 
as in the preceding discussion), none of the three effects discussed in the proposition can be 
signed unambiguously. In other words, we can neither sign the effect on the optimal 
retirement age, nor the effects on the contribution rate and pension benefit, following a 
change in the standard deviation of the length of life. As before, this ambiguity is due to a 
precautionary motive to retire later (earlier) in response to increased (decreased) uncertainty. 
 
The optimal policy-responses to an increase in the average length of life, T , are ambiguous. 
In fact, and somewhat surprisingly, each of the two partial derivatives  / T    and  / R T   
can be either positive or negative in the second best model. There are two counteracting 
forces here (each of which is comprised of several mechanisms). First, the concavity of the 
function () P   and the tax base effect of T  (via increased work hours) constitute a joint 
incentive for the government to increase both   and R  in response to a higher T . The 
intuition is that (i) the expected marginal utility of an additional year spent on retirement 
decreases, and (ii) the government can collect more revenue without lowering the total life-
time consumption, 
max TC  (with T  held constant, this variable decreases in response to a 
higher contribution rate). Second, a higher T  lowers the pension benefit per year spent in 
retirement via the public budget constraint as well as reduces the budgetary gain of an 
increase in the pension fee. These effects work to decrease the optimal pension fee and 
retirement age. Note also that   and R  need not necessarily move in the same direction, as 
the strengths of the mechanisms described above may vary between the policy-variables. The 
effect of an increase in T  on the optimal pension benefit per year spent in retirement is, of 
course, also ambiguous. 
  
5. A Second Best Model with a Private Retirement Decision   14
 
In this section, we relax the assumption that the retirement age is decided upon by the 
government and assume, instead, that the retirement age is a private decision variable. The 
government only decides upon the pension fee and pension benefit per year spent in 




The individual chooses consumption, work hours and retirement age to maximize the 
expected utility subject to the budget constraint presented in equation (8). By substituting the 





(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ii
ii i i i i i
Rh
T
Max R wh T R B E P T R R U H h
T
              
 
where (as before) 
ii TT    with  ( ) 0
i E    and  ( ) 1
i Var   . The first order conditions for 
i h  and 
i R  become 
 




                      (15a) 
  max (1 ) '( ) ( ) 0
ii i i T
wh B E P T R U H h
T
             .              (15b) 
 
Equation (15a) takes the same form as its counterpart in Section 4, whereas equation (15b) is 
novel here and reflects the individual consumer’s choice of retirement age. We can use 
equations (15a) and (15b) to derive the retirement age and the labor supplied when 
participating in the labor market as functions of  , B , T  and  . This gives 
 
  (, , ,)
i RR RB T  

                     (16a) 
  (, )
i hh hT 
 
 .                    (16b) 
 
The comparative statics are derived in the Appendix. We summarize the results as follows; 
   15
Proposition 3. An increase in the contribution rate to the pension system,  , or pension 
benefit per year spent in retirement, B , will reduce the retirement age, and an increase in the 
contribution rate also leads to a decrease in the hours of work, ceteris paribus. With the 
contribution rate and pension benefit per year spent in retirement held constant, it follows 
that (i) an increase in the average length of life leads to increased hours of work as well as an 
increase (decrease) in the retirement age if  (1 ) 0
i wh B    ( 0  ), and (ii) an increase in 
the standard deviation of the length of life leads to a decrease in the retirement age, if the 
preferences for the number of years spent in retirement,  () P  , are characterized by constant 
or decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
 
We now turn to the decision-problem faced by the government and, in particular, the optimal 




As before, the government maximizes the expected utility for a typical cohort with ex-ante 
identical individuals. We write the objective function of the government as the expected 




max (, , ,) (, , ,) (, ) ( 1 ) ( (, , ,) )
[( ( ,,,) ) ] ( ,,,) ( ( ,) )
T
VB T RB Tw h T T RB T B
T
EPT R BT R BT UH h T




.    (17) 
 
The budget constraint of the government is now given by 
 
  (, , ,) (, , ,) (, ) [ (, , ,) ] 0 GB T RB Tw hT TRB T B         ,                (18) 
 
since the government must consider how the hours of work and retirement age (decisions 
made by the individual consumer) are affected by the policy-variables. 
 
Therefore, the government behaves as if it chooses   and B  to maximize the Lagrangean 
 
  (, , ,) (, , ,) LV B T G B T                          (19)   16
 
where    is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s budget constraint. To 
avoid notational clutter, we write the first order conditions for   and B  on the following 
compact form; 
 
 0 VG                         (20a) 
 0 BB VG                         (20b) 
 
where the subscripts attached to the functions  () V   and  () G   denote partial derivatives. We 
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                    (21) 
is fulfilled, where a double subscript denotes second order partial derivative. The formulas for 
V  and  B V  are presented in the Appendix. Since  0 V   and  0 B V  , it follows that  0 G   and 
0 B G   at the second best optimum. In addition, if the preferences for the number of years 
spent in retirement are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion in the 
sense described above, if it straight forward to show that  0 G  . 
 
In general, and contrary to the results derived in the previous section, the changes in the 
optimal contribution rate and pension benefit following a change in the standard deviation of 
the length of life are ambiguous here. This is not surprising, since the government has fewer 
instruments at its disposal here, i.e. the contribution rate and pension benefit must, in this 
case, also be used to influence the retirement age (as well as influence the hours of work and 
consumption, as in the previous section). To be able to derive an unambiguous result, we add 
the following assumption: 
 
A1. (i)  0 G   and  0 B G   , and (ii)  0 BB BB VG VG        . 
 
The first part of assumption A1 restricts the effects that a change in the standard deviation 
may have on the slopes of the public budget constraint in  - and B -space. It means that an 
increase in   must not decrease the marginal budgetary gain of an increase in the contribution   17
rate, and it must not increase the marginal budgetary loss of an increase in the pension benefit. 
This is also interpretable to mean that the budgetary incentive to tax and spend must not be 
deteriorated. The second part of assumption A1 places restraint on the cross derivatives: it 
ensures that the second order condition summarized by (21) is fulfilled. We can now derive 
the following result; 
 
Proposition 4. If the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement are 
characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, and under assumption A1, an 
increase in the standard deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal 
contribution rate, i.e.  /0     at the second best optimum. 
 
The calculations underlying Proposition 4 are presented in the Appendix. As long as the 
preferences for the number of years spent in retirement are characterized by constant or 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, assumption A1 provides a sufficient, not necessary, 
condition for the optimal contribution rate to increase in response to an increase in the 
standard deviation of the length of life. The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows: with 
constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in   unambiguously reduces the 
retirement age with   and B  held constant and, therefore, the tax base. To compensate the 
lost revenue, the government increases the contribution rate to the pension system. However, 
it remains unclear whether the lower tax revenue due to a higher   exceeds, or falls short of, 
the revenue gain following the adjustment in the contribution rate. As a consequence, the 
pension benefit per year spent in retirement, B , may either increase or decrease. This also 




The optimal policy-responses to an increase in the average length of life, T , remain 
ambiguous here as well. As we saw above, an increase in the average life-length typically 
leads to an increase in the tax base both via increased retirement age and increased hours of 
work. This means that the tax revenue increases for a given contribution rate, and the 
government may respond either by an increase or decrease in the contribution rate and still 
                                                 
7 Note that 
 
dR R R R B
dB






Although the first two terms on the right hand side are negative, the third is ambiguous. As a consequence, we 
were not able to sign the sum on the right hand side; let be that a positive value runs counter to intuition.   18
obtain higher revenue than before. In addition, it is not clear whether the average number of 
years spent in retirement will increase or decrease. This also implies that the effect on the 




Contrary to earlier literature on the relationships between life-length, retirement age and 
public policy, which typically concentrates on effects of changes in the average length of life, 
the present paper focuses much attention on how the retirement age as well as the pension 
system (in terms of the contribution rate and pension benefit) ought to change in response to a 
change in the standard deviation of the length of life. Such a study has clear practical 
relevance both because this standard deviation has decreased substantially in most countries 
during the latest centuries, and because significant differences between countries still remain. 
As a consequence, it is important to understand how changes in the standard deviation of life-
length affects the optimal choice of retirement age as well as the optimal contribution to and 
benefit from the pension system. The present paper serves this purpose. 
 
Our results show that the attitude towards risk constitutes a major determinant for how 
individual behavior and public policy may respond to a change in the standard deviation of 
life-length. Although this insight is not in itself very surprising, our relatively simple model 
allows us to derive several quite strong results. In a first best framework, where a benevolent 
government exercises perfect control over the individuals’ consumption, labor supply and 
retirement decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-length 
leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age, if the preferences for “the number of years 
spent in retirement” are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. The 
intuition is that reduced uncertainty about the length of life gives an incentive to postpone 
retirement, because the future benefits associated with retirement are less uncertain than 
before. 
 
In a second best framework, where the government raises revenue via a contribution to the 
pension system (or pension fee) attached to the labor income to finance a uniform lump-sum 
benefit per year spent in retirement, we consider two possible scenarios; (i) the retirement age 
is mandatory and decided upon by the government, and (ii) the retirement age is a private 
decision-variable. In the first scenario, we are able to derive a strong result: if the preferences   19
for the number of years spent in retirement are characterized by constant or decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, then the optimal retirement age, contribution rate and benefit per year 
spent in retirement all increase in response to a decrease in the standard deviation of life-
length. All else equal, this suggests that a country with a lower standard deviation of life-
length ought to have a higher retirement age and more generous pension system (in terms of 
contribution rates and old age benefits) than a country with a higher standard deviation of life-
length. In the second scenario, where the retirement age is a private decision-variable, the 
results are less clear cut. We are able to show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-
length leads to an increase in the retirement age, with the contribution rate and pension benefit 
held constant, and – in a special case – that the optimal contribution rate decreases in response 
to a decrease in the standard deviation. Again, this presupposes constant or decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. 
 
The ambiguity in the second scenario is not surprising, since the government has fewer policy 
instruments at its disposal in that case. As a consequence, it must use the contribution rate and 
pension benefit per year spent in retirement to exercise control over the individual choices of 
consumption, work hours and retirement age. In the first scenario, on the other hand, the 
retirement age is decided upon by the government, which means that the government may use 
the contribution rate and pension benefit solely to affect the labor supply and consumption 
behavior. 
 
One interesting direction for future research would be to relax the (unrealistic) assumption 
that the government is as well informed about individual mortality as the individuals 
themselves. Instead, if we were to introduce asymmetric information, the second best resource 
allocation would be related to these asymmetries, and not to arbitrary restrictions on the set of 
policy instruments. As such, this would enable us to examine how the optimal use of a 
nonlinear tax and pension system responds to increased variation in the length of life, which is 
arguably a realistic extension. Another interesting issue refers to the optimal combination of 
fully-funded and pay-as-you-go pensions, when the length of life is uncertain. We leave these 
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Second Best Model with Mandatory Retirement 
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where the dependence of h on   and T  has been suppressed. The first order conditions 
0   and  0 R  are given by equations (14a) and (14b), respectively. The second order 
conditions, i.e.  0  , 0 RR  and 
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If the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement are characterized by constant or 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, we have  [ ''( )] 0 EPTR    , so  / 0     and  / 0 R    . 









.                       (A9) 
 
If [ ''( )] 0 EPTR   , we have 
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Second Best Model with a Private Retirement Decision 
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Turning to the government, we can use the first order conditions for the individuals to derive 
the following properties of the functions  () V   and  () G  ; 
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gives the comparative statics derivatives 
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